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RESTITUTION AS A BRIDGE OVER
TROUBLED CONTRACTUAL WATERS
Mark P. Gergen*
This essay examines the role that the law of restitution plays in
regulating behavior in contract disputes. Part I makes several
doctrinal and policy arguments for a rule that gives a person a right to
restitution when he renders performance not due under a contract,
provided he renders the performance believing that it might be due to
avoid a loss. Part II advocates abolishing the general right to elect
restitution as an alternative remedy for breach of contract. The rule
proposed in Part I would cover many cases decided under the
traditional rule, including Boomer v. Muir,1 a case often cited as an
example of the perversity of the traditional rule.
I offer this essay as a small tribute to Professor Joseph Perillo.
Professor Perillo's kind of scholarship is undervalued in American law
schools these days.
His approach might be called pragmatic
conceptualism, for his work attends to the conceptual apparatus of the
law while being pragmatic in understanding the frailties of concepts
(as well as the frailties of institutions and of people) and in
appreciating that the law serves plural values. Eric Posner recently
wrote that "[t]his kind of doctrinalism is useful.., but a return to this
scholarship would have to count as a defeat for the descriptive and
normative aspirations of modern legal theory."2 For scholarship to be
useful is quite an accomplishment, but Posner underestimates the goal
of what he calls "narrow... doctrinalism."3 The goal is not, as Posner
says, "to support the outcome in a given case." 4 That usually is easy to
do. The aspiration-and it is just that-is to give a coherent,
consistent, and clear account of a mass of decisions. This is difficult
I thank Hans Baade, Andrew Kull, Douglas Laycock, and Alan Rau for their
insights and comments. This essay grew out of a paper entitled "Exit and Loyalty in
Contract," which was presented at the International Conference on Comparative
Remedies for Breach of Contract at Tel Aviv University (June 2002).
1. 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
2. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades:
Success or Failure, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 146 (2d
Series), Mar. 2002, at 44, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/index.html. This is
a passing remark in an intelligent autopsy of economic analysis of contract law. If
Posner's style was more poetic this might be called an elegy for the contract branch of
law and economics.
3. Id.
4. Id.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

enough to do in a unitary legal system with a small, homogeneous
legal elite, such as England once was, or as Rome was in Gaius's time.
It is all the more difficult to achieve, but all the more important to try,
in our sprawling legal system. Professor Perillo has done this type of
scholarship as well as any contracts scholar of his generation.
One of Professor Perillo's particular contributions has been to
clarify the role that the law of restitution plays in a contractual setting.
His 1973 article shows that when a restitution claim is brought for
breach of contract, or when a contract runs afoul of the statute of
frauds or the doctrine of indefiniteness, a plaintiff will recover the cost
of his performance even though the defendant's benefit is less.5 In
other words, restitution serves a compensatory goal in these settings.6
Professor Perillo makes the larger claim in the 1973 article and in a
1981 article that restitution serves the goals or policies of contract law
when it is used in a contractual setting.7 He mentions Boomer v. Muir
5. Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a ContractualContext, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208
(1973).
6. This may seem little more than an interesting bit of doctrinal history to a
generation accustomed to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which says that
restitution is enrichment-based and substitutes explicitly reliance-based theories of
recovery. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 344(2), 349, 370. In a 1981 article on
the Second Restatement, Professor Perillo said that these changes combined
"outworn dogma with audacious innovation." Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in the
Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 37, 37 (1981). He was cautiously
optimistic about the innovation at the time. But a number of states have not
embraced reliance-based recovery when a contract is unenforceable under the statute
of frauds. The possibility of reliance-based recovery in restitution remains important
in these states.
Professor Perillo's 1973 article does not explore an important subsidiary question.
He focuses on cases where restitution is used to recover on unkept informal promises.
Restitution, however, also is available when a contract is vitiated by unexpected
circumstances. And, sometimes, a party is able to recover in restitution for precontractual expenditures when a contract falls through. Does restitution serve a
compensatory function in these settings, as well, or is the goal to prevent the
defendant from being unexpectedly enriched at the plaintiff's expense? I think the
answer is the latter because in these situations we do not consider the defendant to be
at fault.
Allen v. Dunston, 958 P.2d 1150 (Idaho 1998), raises, but does not resolve, this
question. The plaintiffs built a water well on land on which the defendant had a life
estate, after she indicated she would give them an easement but before the deal was
finalized with the defendant and the owner of the remainder. Id. at 1151. The court
held that there was no contract because there was "no meeting of the minds," but
remanded the restitution claim. Id. at 1152. On remand, the defendant should
analogize the claim to the case of mistaken improvement while the plaintiffs should
analogize their claim to the case of a contract vitiated by informality. If the case is
analogized to a mistaken improvement, then the plaintiffs recover nothing if there is
significant doubt about the value of the water well to the defendant. If the case is
analogized to a contract vitiated by informality, then the plaintiffs may recover the
cost of the well though this exceeds the value to the defendant.
7. Professor Perillo does not dwell on the strongest case for his general claim.
This is where the defaulting party recovers the value of his part performance in
restitution. Most students learn this through Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
This result is entirely consistent with the expectation and mitigation principles.
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as an exception to this general claim.8 By showing that Boomer is not
an exception, I reinforce Professor Perillo's general claim, which I
think is right on the money.
I. A RIGHT TO RESTITUTION FOR PERFORMANCE RENDERED IN A
DISPUTE

A. The Cases
Muir9

Boomer v.
has been called the "classic example" of how a
plaintiff can use the optional restitution remedy on a breach of
contract claim to reverse a bad bargain." Boomer was hired to build a
storage dam as part of a large hydroelectric project managed by
Storrie & Co."
Boomer abandoned work on the storage dam
although it was near completion, claiming that Storrie had breached
the contract in a number of ways." Storrie denied any fault. 3 When
he stopped work, Boomer had been paid all but $20,000 of the
contract price of approximately $330,000.14 Boomer's costs were
much higher, almost $600,000.15 The court, finding that Storrie had
materially breached the contract, awarded Boomer its unrecovered
costs in restitution. 6
Boomer has attracted a fair amount of attention from scholars,
much of it critical of the decision. Some commentators have strained
to justify the result.17 But others have noted that there is a simple
explanation for the decision. George Cohen calls Boomer the "classic
example" of "the easiest case to explain" because Storrie's breach was
responsible for the cost overrun. 8 Cohen's argument comes straight
8. Perillo, supra note 6, at 44.
9. 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
10. Louis E. Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret in Contract Remedies, 73
Iowa L. Rev. 797, 809 n.57 (1988). For similar accounts of Boomer, see Douglas
Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 648-51 (2002); Andrew
Skelton, Restitution and Contract 1 n.3 (1998); Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy
for Breach, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1465, 1471 (1994); Perillo, supra note 6, at 44.
11. Boomer, 24 P.2d at 571.
12. Id. at 572.
13. Id. at 572-74.
14. Id. at 572, 578.
15. Id. at 572.
16. Id. at 579-80.
17. Wendy J. Gordon & Tamar Frankel, Enforcing Coasean Bribes for Non-Price
Benefits: A New Role for Restitution, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1519 (1994) (commenting on
Kull's article and arguing that Boomer may have continued to perform even though
its costs were higher than expected because it expected intangible benefits from the
contract).
18. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1225,
1304 (1994). Eric G. Andersen, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of
Contract, 53 Md. L. Rev. 1, 22-26 (1994), makes a similar argument for sometimes
allowing a contractor to recover more than the contract price. See also Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Extra Work in Construction Cases: Restitution, Relationship, and
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from the opinion where it was offered as an alternative basis for the
decision:
The jury might well have found that Boomer's cost of operation
had been substantially increased by Storrie & Co.'s continuing
breaches. There is substantial evidence that Boomer suffered delays
and increased costs by Storrie & Co.'s failure to deliver materials to
the job as rapidly as required. There is evidence that Boomer's costs
were considerably increased by failure of Storrie & Co. to excavate
the cut-off trench as rapidly as should have been done. There is
evidence that the diversion of air from the compressors to other
portions of the work and the delay in restoring the burned air
compressors hampered Boomer and increased his costs. 19
Boomer is not unusual in this respect. In a fair number of cases in
which a plaintiff elects restitution on breach to recover costs in excess
of the contract price, the cost overruns are attributable to the
defendant's breach of contract."z There also are a fair number of
counterexamples of cases in which the award to the plaintiff of costs
above the contract price seems to give the plaintiff a windfall.2 ' My
Revision, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 799, 831-34 (1989), who discusses a related line of contractor
hindrance cases and situates them alongside cases involving cost overruns due to
change orders, unexpected circumstances, and other causes.
19. Boomer, 24 P.2d at 578.
20. Another prominent case, Philadelphia v. Tripple, 79 A. 703 (Pa. 1911), is
similar. Dietrich employed McMenamy to excavate, lay pipe, and perform other
work for conduits from the Delaware River to a pumping station. Id. at 704. Because
of a defect in the construction of the pumping station, the conduit had to be driven
deeper than expected and McMenamy had problems with flooding. Id. The conduit
had to be redirected and McMenamy continued to work as he fell further behind
schedule. Id. Eventually Dietrich became impatient and ordered McMenamy off the
job. Id. at 704-05. Similar cases include: United States ex rel. Wallace v. Flintco Inc.,
143 F.3d 955, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1998) (allowing quantum meruit damages, despite the
lack of damages for delay clause where contractor actively interfered with
subcontractor); United States ex rel. Citizens National Bank v. Stringfellow, 414 F.2d
696, 698 (5th Cir. 1.969) (allowing over double contract price for moving dirt because
defendant's interference significantly increased plaintiff's cost); Acme Process
Equipment Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds,
385 U.S. 138 (1966) (attributing cost overruns to government and third parties
although the decision denies recovery for unreasonable costs or for costs attributable
to government where plaintiff bore the risks of those costs under a separate contract);
W.F. Magann Corp. v. Diamond Manufacturing. Co., 580 F. Supp. 1299 (D.S.C. 1984)
(citing unanticipated site conditions, defective specifications, and changed conditions
as contributing to costs); Stark v. Magnuson, 2 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1942) (awarding
damages to tenant farmer who was promised one-half of proceeds from sale of cattle
he tended, where defendant unjustifiably refused to sell the cattle when the market
was favorable); Robinson v. Powers, 777 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that contractor incorrectly marked boundary and elevation, making extra work
necessary); FarrellHeating, Plumbing, Air Conditioning Contractors, Inc. v. Facilities
Development & Improvement Corp., 414 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1979) (holding that failure to
remove mental patients from work area interfered with contractor's work).
21. United States ex rel. C.J.C., Inc. v. W. States Mech. Contractors, Inc., 834 F.2d
1533 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that, while the general contractor's misdeeds increased
the subcontractor's costs, the subcontractor also had significantly underbid the job);
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sense is that well over half of the cases that award restitution of costs
above contract price can be explained in the same way as Boomer.2 2
Boomer belongs alongside a group of cases that do not involve use
of the elective restitution remedy on breach. In this second group of
cases, the plaintiff performs a disputed contractual obligation under
protest and then brings a restitution claim to recover the extra cost.
ABC Electric, Inc. v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd.23 is one such case. A
subcontractor and a general contractor disagreed about the scope of
electric work to be done by the subcontractor on a construction
project. 24 The general contractor claimed that the subcontractor had
agreed to do all the work required.2 ' The subcontractor claimed that
he agreed only to do the work in the job specifications.2 6 The
subcontractor went ahead and did all of the electric work demanded
by the general contractor and then he brought a restitution claim for
The court agreed with the
the cost of the extra work. 7
subcontractor's position on the scope of work and awarded him
restitution.28
In a similar vein, a 1999 English case, Nurdin & Peacock Plc. v.
D.B. Ramsden & Co.,29 allowed a tenant to recover excess rent that it
United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that
subcontractor withdrew when general contractor refused to pay cost of crane rental);
In re Estate of Lampert, 896 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1995); In re Montgomery Estate, 6
N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that an attorney who was discharged without cause
after partial performance was entitled to recovery of more than $10,000, although
contract price for full performance was $5,000). In Paterno & Sons, Inc. v. Town of
New Windsor, 351 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1974), there is a sharp dissent to a decision
endorsing a potential restitution award of over four times the contract price. The
dissent argues that in the New York decisions relied upon by the court, the award of
restitution damages responded to problems of proof. Id. at 449 (Benjamin, J.,
dissenting).
22. From a reading of the cases collected in the Palmer and Corbin treatises, it
appears that the number of misfits is fairly high, though still less than half. The
number of misfits is much lower in cases collected under West Key Number 65 for
Implied and Constructive Contracts. I found a number of additional fits and no clear
additional misfits in the cases dating back to 1984.
23. 249 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Associated Wrecking and Salvage Co. v.
Wiekhorst Bros. Excavating & Equip. Co., 424 N.W.2d 343 (Neb. 1988). National
Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Fuel Recovery Co., 432 N.W.2d 788 (Minn.
App. 1988), allowed recovery on the theory that the additional work was necessitated
by a supervening event outside the scope of the original contract. The contractor in
that case was hired to clean up a leak from a fuel tank, and ended up cleaning the
effect of a second leak. Id. at 789-90. The contractor and its employer (an insurer)
disputed whether the contract was for a fixed price or whether it was cost-plus. Id. at
790.
24. ABC Electric,249 F.3d at 767.
25. Id. at 765-66.
26. Id. at 766.
27. Id. at 767.
28. Id. at 768.
29. 1 W.L.R. 1249 (Ch. 1999). The case also involved overcharges before the
tenant was aware of the possibility it was being overcharged. Recovery of those
overcharges presented no issue. Id. at 1259-61.
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paid under protest in a dispute over the calculation of rent. The same
general issue has repeatedly arisen in the context of liability insurance.
A liability insurer disputes coverage of a third party claim, but
nevertheless provides a defense or pays to settle the claim under
protest. The cases are split on whether an insurer may recover its
expense in this situation, assuming it can establish that the claim was
not covered.3"
The second group of cases is the more interesting doctrinally. The
law of restitution may not be needed to reach the result in Boomer,

given modern rules of contract law. This was not always so. The first
Restatement of Contracts categorically precludes awarding expenses

above the contract price as contract damages.31 A plaintiff in
Boomer's situation might also run afoul of the traditional contract law
30. Lansing Board of Water & Light v. Deerfield Insurance Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d
979, 991 (W.D. Mich. 2002), holds that an insurer has a right in restitution to recover
an amount paid under protest to settle an uncovered claim in the absence of a
reimbursement agreement. Coverage turned on the scope of the pollution exclusion.
Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Shierk, 996 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. I11.1998), holds that
an insurer may recover the cost of a defense tendered under a reservation of rights.
Id. at 839. Coverage turned on whether the insured had committed a crime when he
shot his wife. Id. at 838. The decision seems to rest on a contract theory-that the
insured agreed to reimburse defense costs when it did not stop the insurer from
proceeding under a reservation of rights. Id. at 838-39. The insured had said it would
not agree to any reimbursement obligation. Id. at 839. Walbrook Insurance Co. v.
Goshgarian& Goshgarian,726 F. Supp. 777, 777-84 (C.D. Cal. 1989), and Knapp v.
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 932 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 (D. Minn. 1996),
are similar. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1089
(Colo. 1991) (en banc), states that an insurer faced with a claim that might be within
the pollution exclusion (which turned on whether the discharge was sudden and
accidental) can defend under a reservation of rights and recover its costs, should the
facts at trial prove the claim was not covered. Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766
(Cal. 1997), addresses a related problem framing the issue in restitution. California
law requires the insurer to defend all the claims in a "mixed" action. Id. at 775. Here,
a defamation claim was covered under the Comprehensive General Liability policy,
but other claims were not. Id. at 770. Buss holds that the insurer has a right to
reimbursement for costs that are allocable to defending uncovered claims. Id. at 775.
Blue Ridge Insurance Co. v. Jacobsen, 10 Fed. Appx. 563, 2001 WL 580804 (9th Cir.
2001), extends Buss to enable an insurer to recover an amount paid to settle a claim in
a coverage dispute.
Texas Ass'n of Counties County Government Risk Management Pool v. Matagorda
County, 52 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2000), denies restitution of an amount paid under protest
to settle a claim that was later determined to be uncovered. Shoshone First Bank v.
Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 2 P.3d 510 (Wyo. 2000), denies reimbursement for
the costs of defending uncovered claims in a mixed action.
For an intelligent analysis of the cases see Robert H. Jerry II, The Insurer'sRight to
Reimbursement of Defense Costs, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 13 (2000). Jerry criticizes
grounding this right in restitution because he believes the law of restitution is too
unstable. Id. at 64 n.197. Instead, he suggests a contractual ground-an interim
settlement of an unliquidated claim. Id. at 69-73. Douglas R. Richmond, Reimbursing
Insurer's Defense Costs: Restitution and Mixed Actions, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 457
(1998), provides a good review of the cases, particularly those in California.
31. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 333 (stating that expenditures in
performance of a contract "are not recoverable in excess of the full contract price
promised by the defendant").
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rule requiring that damages be proven with reasonable certainty,
assuming he could not isolate the expenses attributable to the
defendant's breach.32 Modern rules of contract law are more flexible.
The "total cost" method of calculating damages under a construction
contract when a defendant hinders a contractor's performance is a
tailored solution to the Boomer problem.3
It is much more difficult to fashion a contract claim in the situation
of ABC Electric.34 A person's good faith demand for work that is not
within the scope of the contract is not a breach of contract, so long as
the person does not withhold or threaten to withhold his own
performance in making the demand.35 Nor is it possible to find an
implied-in-fact contract because it is clear that the person demanding
performance as a matter of right did not agree to pay for it outside of
the contract.
ABC Electric and Nurdin also pose doctrinal difficulties in the
common law of restitution. Gerhard Dannemann observes that
German courts regularly give restitution in the situation of Nurdin
while the English court strained to reach that result.36 Dannemann
attributes this to different general rules atop what the Germans call
the law of unjustified enrichment and what the English call the law of
restitution.3 7 In German law, Dannemann explains, "an enrichment is
32. Green Plumbing, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co., 742 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1984),
is a representative case in which a contractor recovered nothing on a delay claim
because of his inability to isolate damages.
33. Thalle Constr. Co. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 39 F.3d 412, 418-19 (2d
Cir. 1994) (applying New York law). WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409
(1968), a leading case, requires that: (i) the nature of the loss make it impossible to
determine damages to a reasonable degree of certainty; (ii) the original bid was
realistic; (iii) the actual costs were reasonable; and (iv) the contractor was not at fault.
Id. at 426. Bernard A. Aaen, The Total Cost Method of Calculating Damages in
Construction Cases, 22 Pac. L.J. 1185, 1188 n.10 (1991), reports that a majority of
recent cases since the late 1970s adopted this method and cites only two dissenting
cases. For a recent case that rejects the "total cost" method because of the
uncertainty of obligation, see Amelco Electric v. City of Thousand Oaks, 38 P.3d 1120
(Cal. 2002).
34. Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Kandik Construction, Inc. & Associates, 795
P.2d 793 (Alaska 1990), draws precisely this line between restitution and contract. It
holds that a claim for cost overruns resulting from work in the scope of the original
contract must be brought in contract, while a claim for work completed outside the
scope of the original contract must be brought in restitution. Id. at 800.
35. See Reiss v. Murchison, 503 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the filing of
a claim of total breach does not give the party against whom the claim is asserted the
right to halt performance); see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 104 B.R. 637 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Dixie Roof Decks, Inc. v. Borggren/Dickson Constr., Inc., 395 S.E.2d 19 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1990); Oak Ridge Constr. Co. v. Tolley, 504 A.2d 1343, 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985). For a case holding that asserting a claim in bad faith is not a repudiation
amounting to default, see Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Public Utilities, 682 F.2d 883
(10th Cir. 1982).
36. Gerhard Dannemann, Unjust Enrichment by Transfer: Some Comparative
Remarks, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1837, 1852-53 (2001).
37. Id. at 1850. The American cases awarding restitution damages tend to rely on
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unjustified... rather than unjust... unless there is a specific legal
reason why it should be kept ....[T]his general rule is the exact
opposite of the English general rule that the enrichment need not be
given up."38 In Nurdin, the court relied on the theory of mistake of
law. This theory is inconsistent with the well-settled and useful
precept that the doctrine of mistake does not protect someone who
performs an obligation that he knows is doubtful.39 Losing a
calculated bet may be a result of misjudgment, it is not a mistake in
the conventional meaning of the term. Duress may seem like a
plausible alternative ground for restitution, but the plaintiff in these
cases usually does not face the sort of dire and unredressable
consequences that are necessary to sustain a duress claim should he
not perform as demanded. 0
These difficulties are a product of legal doctrine. Boomer and ABC
Electric are similar in that in both cases the plaintiff performed a
disputed obligation under protest and then sued to recover the
resulting cost. If Boomer truly is an easy case to explain, as some have
said, then a rule can be crafted to cover both it and ABC Electric,
which would solve the doctrinal problem. So on to the next question.
B. What Is the Right Rule?
George Cohen said Boomer is the "easiest case to explain" because
"the breaching party contributes to making the contract a losing
one." 41 But the plaintiff in Boomer also was responsible for the cost
overrun. He could have stopped work after Storrie breached rather
than running up costs. Andrew Kull is on to something when he
argues that
a rule permitting a restitutionary recovery unlimited by the contract
the general principle of unjust enrichment. E.g., Associated Wrecking & Salvage Co.
v. Wiekhorst Bros. Excavating & Equip. Co., 424 N.W.2d 343 (Neb. 1988).
The defendant clearly benefited from the labor of the plaintiff; thus, the
plaintiff should be awarded the reasonable value of the services rendered.
Stated another way, this law of restitution "deals with situations in which
one person is accountable to another on the ground that otherwise he would
unjustly benefit or the other would unjustly suffer loss."
Id. at 348-49 (citation omitted); see also ABC Elec., Inc. v. Neb. Beef, Ltd., 249 F.3d
762, 765 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Under the Nebraska law of quantum meruit, ABC is
entitled to recover the reasonable value of electrical services that it performed for
Nebraska Beef's benefit in circumstances that would make it inequitable for Nebraska
Beef not to pay.").
38. Dannemann, supra note 36, at 1840.
39. Armco, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc., 696 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1983), relies on

the precept that the doctrine of mistake will not protect someone who pays a debt in
willful ignorance to deny a claim seeking restitution of payments made to third parties
in a dispute.
40. CTN Cash & Carry Ltd. v. Gallaher Ltd., 4 All E.R. 714 (Eng. C.A. 1994),

rejects a duress claim.
41. Cohen, supra note 18, at 1304.
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price has the effect of undoing the allocation of risks negotiated by
the parties, indeed of writing a new contract to replace the one the
defendant has breached or
.... repudiated. A defendant... is held to a
bargain he did not make
To allow a person to proceed with performance in response to an
alleged breach or a contested demand for performance by the other
contracting party, and then recover for the cost of performance
outside the contract, imposes an obligation on the other party that he
did not agree to undertake.
A stronger version of the argument is made as justification for
denying a liability insurer restitution from its insured for the cost of
defending or settling an uncovered claim when the insurer provides a
defense or pays to settle a claim on which it disputes coverage.
[T]o allow the insurer to force the insured into choosing between
seeking a defense under the policy, and run the potential risk of
having to pay for this defense if it is subsequently determined that
no duty to defend existed, or giving up all meritorious claims that a
duty to defend exists, places the insured in the position of making a
Hobson's choice.43 Furthermore, endorsing such conduct is
tantamount to allowing the insurer to extract a unilateral
amendment to the insurance contract.44
This argument can be sharpened. Sometimes an insurer is willing to
pay more to settle a claim than its insured because the insurer is
wealthier and has more assets at risk. Or an insurer may be willing to
pay more to defend a claim because it is a repeat player. In either
event, giving the insurer a right to restitution for settlement or defense
costs if the claim is uncovered puts the insured in a dilemma-the
insured must either withdraw his request for coverage or submit to the
risk of being put to a welfare-reducing exchange.
This phenomenon is not unique to the insurance context. It could
have occurred in Boomer. Perhaps the cost overrun was due to
Boomer's effort to meet the original deadline. Perhaps Storrie would
have preferred a delay in completion to paying almost double the
price for the work if those were his only choices. If so, then allowing
Boomer to continue to work while the parties dispute responsibility
for the cost overruns and later recover its costs if it is in the right puts
Storrie in much the same dilemma as the insured in the above
42. Kull, supra note 10, at 1472 (footnotes omitted).
43. This is a misuse of the term. A Hobson's choice is no choice at all. The
storied origin is Thomas Hobson, a stable keeper in Cambridge, England, who
required his customers to take the horse nearest the stable door or none. Cambridge
City
Council,
Thomas
Hobson
1544
1630,
at
www.cambridge.gov.uk/cambridge800/hobson.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
44. Shoshone First Bank v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510, 516 (Wyo. 2000)
(citing Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, America States Ins. Co. v.
Ridco, Inc., Civ. No. 95CV158D (D. Wyo. 1999)). This argument is cited with
approval in Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Tex. 2000). See supra note 30.
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example. To avoid the risk of a welfare-reducing exchange if Boomer
is in the right on the underlying dispute, Storrie must either
renegotiate, which would require it to give up its claim of a right to
have the work done on time at the original price, or it must bar
Boomer from the site, which a court might hold to be a material
breach of contract by Storrie, even if Storrie is in the right on the
underlying dispute.
To answer this argument, I begin by situating the problem in the
law. The problem can be thought of as defining background rules of
engagement when a dispute about contract rights or obligation arises
before performance. Sometimes the background rules of engagement
favor finality in the sense that if a person performs or accepts
performance in a dispute, that will be the end of the matter, and any
claim he might otherwise have will be cut off. But sometimes the
background rules do not make performance final; a person may
perform or accept performance in a dispute and later press his claim
of a right to do or to receive something else.
Contrasting these two bodies of rules suggests a common sense
analysis that preserves a claim of right when a party performs in a
dispute if such performance avoids a loss and does not unduly
complicate litigation. This doctrinal argument is supported by a policy
argument that such a background rule is likely to be in the joint
interest of all of the parties to a contract.
Another argument made in the insurance cases for denying
restitution can be quickly dispatched. The argument is that a person
should resolve a dispute about his rights or obligations before
accepting performance or performing by getting a declaratory
judgment.45 Often this is not a realistic option. Getting a final
judgment in a hard-fought civil case can take years in the United
States.46 There are no preliminary declaratory judgments.4 7 In the

45. See Shoshone First Bank, 2 P.3d at 516.
46. John Goerdt et al., Nat'l Center for State Courts, Examining Court Delay:
The Pace Of Litigation in 26 Urban Trial Courts, 1987 xiii (1989) (finding that while
seven of the twenty-six large urban trial courts studied disposed of felony cases within
one year of arrest and fourteen had ten percent or less pending at one year after
arrest, only two courts were close to disposing of civil cases within two years of filing);
Steven K. Smith et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, Tort Cases in
Large Counties (Apr. 1995) (average time to dispose of tort case in the nation's
seventy-five largest counties was slightly more than one and one half years; average
time for processing of cases that were tried was two years).
47. See Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) ("[P]rior to final judgment
there is no established declaratory remedy comparable to a preliminary injunction ...
."). Sometimes a preliminary injunction may be sought to compel the other party to
perform. In most cases where a preliminary injunction is sought in a contract setting
the plaintiff seeks to prevent the defendant from acting in a way that would make
performance impossible. For example, a buyer will seek an injunction to prevent a
seller from disposing of property that is under contract. Courts are reluctant to grant
preliminary injunctions in such cases even when the property is unique. TexacoPennzoil, which resulted in a multi-billion dollar verdict on a theory of tortious
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particular context of liability insurance-where coverage disputes
often are resolved by declaratory judgment-the availability of a
declaratory judgment is circumscribed by a doctrine that stays the
declaratory judgment action when the coverage determination turns
on facts that will be resolved in the underlying litigation.48
1. Rules of Engagement for Contract Disputes
The voluntary payment doctrine is the preeminent rule of finality
when a person performs a disputed obligation. The doctrine bars a
debtor who pays a disputed debt from bringing a restitution claim to
recover the payment.4 9 The rationale for the doctrine is to ensure
"that those who desire to assert a legal right do so at the first possible
opportunity; this way, all interested parties are aware of that position
and have the opportunity to tailor their own conduct accordingly."50
Other rules eliminate a later claim by a creditor who accepts part
payment for the balance of his claim. The rules on accord and
satisfaction permit what has been described as "an exquisite form of
commercial torture"' 51 by enabling a debtor to tender part payment of
a disputed debt that the creditor can take only if he relinquishes his
claim for the balance. 2 And a creditor has little hope of avoiding a
interference, provides a notable illustration. When Getty and Texaco announced
their deal, Pennzoil, the disappointed suitor for Getty, immediately sought a
preliminary injunction in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The court denied the
request for an injunction, though it found that Getty would probably win on the
merits on the contract claim against Pennzoil and that it would suffer irreparable
injury because the injunction would also implicate third parties-Gordon Getty and
Texaco-against whom Getty's claim was less certain. The unreported decision is
Pennzoil, Civ. A. No. 7425, 1984 WL 15664 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 1984). When a contract
does not involve a unique asset, plaintiffs run into the traditional view that loss of
money, even if difficult to measure, is not irreparable injury sufficient to justify a
preliminary injunction. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule
112, 121-22 (1991).
48. E.g., Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 130 F.3d 787, 794 (7th
Cir. 1997); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1164 (Cal.
1993); Murphy v. Urso, 430 N.E.2d 1079 (Ill. 1982) (Kennard, J., concurring);
Chesapeake Physicians Prof'l Ass'n v. Home Ins., Co., 608 A.2d 822 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 572 A.2d 154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). But
see Reisen v. Aetna Life & Cas., 302 S.E.2d 529 (Va. 1983).
49. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 6 cmt. e &
illus. 18 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (stating that the voluntary payment rule will bar
recovery of payment of disputed claim). Reporter's Note (e) provides additional
authority.
50. Randazzo v. Harris Bank Palatine, 262 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2001).
51. James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the
Uniform Commercial Code § 13-21, at 544 (2d ed. 1994). This sentiment is echoed in
Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 488 N.E.2d 56, 59 (N.Y.
1985).
52. The history of Uniform Commercial Code § 1-207 attests to the strength of
this practice. The statute allows a party to reserve his rights while accepting
performance offered by the other party. Although, at first, the statute did not have an
explicit exception, many courts held that this provision did not apply to an accord and
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release on the ground of duress because of a precept foreclosing
claims of financial distress.5 3
The voluntary payment doctrine has the familiar stickiness of an
interpretive presumption. Payment is final unless the parties state
clearly that this was not their intent. The rule is sticky in another,
more unusual way. Under the traditional rule, a debtor cannot avoid
the voluntary payment doctrine by saying when he pays that he
reserves his right to recover the money if it is not due.54 The rules on
accord and satisfaction (and the precept foreclosing a duress claim)

satisfaction. Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983), is a leading
case holding that the statute did not alter the common-law rule. For a contrary case
that reviews the arguments and authority on both sides, see Horn Waterproofing
Corp., 488 N.E.2d at 56. An explicit exception was added to the Uniform Commercial
Code in 1990.
53. One often-litigated question involves the effectiveness of a release given by a
creditor to settle a disputed debt when, in exchange for the release, the debtor pays a
sum that was not in dispute. The weight of the authority supports the premise that a
release is valid in these circumstances, provided there is a single debt or closely
related debts. Kilander v. Blickle Co., 571 P.2d 503, 504-05 (Or. 1977) (en banc).
There is authority, however, that "circumstances of unfair pressure or economic
coercion" cut in the other direction. Flagel v. S.W. Clinical Physiatrists, 755 P.2d 1184,
1190 (Ariz. App. 1988).
54. For clear statements that a reservation of rights does not avoid the voluntary
payment doctrine, see Rowe v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 12 So. 2d 431, 43334 (Miss. 1943), and Relaxation of Common-law Rule Regarding Recovery of
Voluntary Payment, 75 A.L.R. 658 (1931) (stating that a payment may not be
recovered "though the payer makes the payment with an express reservation of his
right to litigate the claim"). This rule is codified in Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. § 13-1-13
(1982). The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment will take this
position.
A handful of cases hold that a reservation of rights avoids the bar of the voluntary
payment doctrine. See Cmty. Convalescent Ctr. of Naperville, Inc. v. First Interstate
Mortgage Co. of Ill., 537 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (I11.1989) ("[S]ince plaintiff paid the 30
days' interest 'under protest,' plaintiff is not barred from recovery under the
voluntary-payment doctrine."); Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, Civ. A. No. 85-3277 (RCL),
1992 WL 93128, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1992) ("The voluntary payment doctrine does
not generally apply, however, when a party has expressly reserved a right to take
some legal action or when the party has paid under protest."). A few other cases state
in dicta that a debtor could have reserved his rights. Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 671;
Prenalta Corp. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1991); City of
Miami v. Keton, 115 So. 2d 547, 552 (Fla. 1959); Getto v. City of Chicago, 426 N.E.2d
844 (Ill. 1981); Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of S.E. Wis., 633 N.W.2d 254, 263 (Wis.
2001).
The older cases tend to treat protest as evidence of duress. This comes from
framing the issue as a problem in restitution. If the issue is framed as a problem in
contract, then the question is what will establish an agreement by the payee that the
payment is conditional upon the validity of his claim. Such an agreement avoids the
bar of the voluntary payment doctrine. See Restatement of Restitution § 45 cmt. e
(1937) ("The rule stated in this Section does not apply if the parties have agreed that
the payment is conditional upon the validity of the transferee's claim."). The general
principle that the offeror is master of the offer supports the minority view that if the
payor conditions payment on a reservation of rights, the payee acquiesces when he
accepts the payment. The court in Prenalta Corp. approached the issue from this
perspective. 944 F.2d at 685.
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are similar in that they prevent the creditor from unilaterally reserving
his right to sue for the balance if he takes part payment tendered in
satisfaction of his claim. The upshot of these rules is that avoiding
finality requires both parties' assent."
Performance is not always final under the common law. Sometimes
a person may perform (or accept performance) in a dispute and still
have his day in court. The extreme facts of Henrici v. South Feather
Land & Water Co.56 make it a good case for illustrating this side of the
law. South Feather assumed a long-term contract to supply water to
Henrici's farm. 7 It later proposed a new pricing scheme that slightly
increased Henrici's payments.58 Henrici denied that South Feather
had the right to increase price and he refused to take water on the
new terms, although this resulted in the ruin of his farm.59 The court
held that while Henrici was correct in the underlying dispute he could
not recover for the damage to his farm because he should have
mitigated damages by taking the water and later suing to recover the
over-payment.6" The court's reasoning assumes that the voluntary
payment doctrine would not have barred a suit by Henrici to recover
an overpayment. The opinion does not mention the doctrine. 6'
Changing the facts in Henrici illustrates other rules on this side of
the law. What would have happened had South Feather offered the
water on the condition that Henrici irrevocably submit to paying the
price demanded? This is the accord and satisfaction gambit. Clearly,
Henrici could recover for the loss of his farm if he refused the water
55. The rule under the voluntary payment doctrine-that the payor cannot
unilaterally reserve rights-is the more interesting side of this coin, for it is
inconsistent with the general principle that the offeror is master of the offer. The
payor is really making a settlement offer.
56. 170 P. 1135 (Cal. 1918). Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967,
1005 n.99 (1983), collects other cases holding that a promisee acted inappropriately in
refusing to do business with a defaulter. The article claims that courts recognize a
duty to do business with a defaulter when there are significant gains from cooperation
and there is no bad faith extortion and risk of under-compensation.
57. 170 P. at 1137.
58. Id. at 1136.
59. He had no other source of water for irrigation. Id.
60. Id. at 1137.
61. Presumably Henrici had another option. He might have tendered the old
price pending resolution of the dispute. Had South Feather responded to this tender
by cutting off the water supply, that would have been a material breach and it would
be responsible for the damage to Henrici's farm. Henrici's tender of the old price
would not have been a breach material enough to justify suspension of performance
by South Feather because any loss from underpayment could have easily been
compensated should South Feather have been in the right. Further, Henrici's tender
of the old price would have been in good faith. In sum, Henrici had two choices in the
case-he could have paid either the new or the old price pending resolution of the
dispute-between which the law is indifferent. This is sensible because, putting issues
like insolvency and collection to the side, there is no reason to prefer one party over
the other when we ask who should hold money in dispute pending resolution.
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and turned out to be in the right on the pricing dispute. His duty to
mitigate would not require him to relinquish his claim of a right to pay
less.62 Moreover, under U.C.C. § 1-207, Henrici might still be able to
63
take the water and reserve his rights by saying that he was doing so.
This response enables Henrici to test South Feather's resolve because
South Feather would have to follow through on its threat to stop
delivery of water in response to Henrici's refusal to abandon his claim
of a right to the old price.
The law even might have allowed Henrici to deceive South Feather
to defuse the conflict. If Henrici had agreed to South Feather's
demand to get the water he desperately needed, he might have been
able to avoid the contract by claiming duress. South Feather's threat
to withhold water was borderline extortion and a core instance of bad
faith because the threatened action of cutting off the water would
inflict a large loss on Henrici while yielding a small benefit to South
Feather. 6' The effect of the doctrine of duress and U.C.C. § 1-207 is to
allow a person to decide unilaterally, against the expressed will of the
other party to the contract, that performance is not final. This is the
opposite of the voluntary payment doctrine and cognate rules, which
make performance final unless both parties agree to the contrary.
The boundaries between these two sets of rules are not welldefined. There is little in the voluntary payment doctrine to preclude
6
its application had Henrici paid what South Feather demanded. 1
62. "If the party in breach offers to perform the contract for a different price, this
may amount to a suitable alternative. But this is not the case if the offer is conditioned
on surrender by the injured party of his claim for breach." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 350 cmt. e (1981); see id. at illus. 15 (based on Gilson v. F.S. Royster
Guano Co., 1 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1924)); see also 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1043, at 274-75
(2d ed. 1962) (stating that there is no duty to take substitute performance from
defaulting party if it would involve a surrender of rights, compromise, or accord and
satisfaction).
63. U.C.C. § 1-207 (2001). This is implicit in the line of cases holding that a
creditor can use § 1-207 to take payment offered in satisfaction and then sue for the
balance.
64. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(a) defines a threat as improper
"if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms" and "the threatened act would harm
the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party making the threat." Silsbee
v. Webber, 50 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1898) (involving a threat by employer directed at
employee's mother to tell his ill father of his theft if mother did not pay off the loss),
is an example in the blackmail mold. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay
in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253, 282-88 (1947), proposes disproportionality as an
organizing principle.
65. Palmer argues that doubt about a debt should not always bar recovery of a
payment. He cites Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Cudd, 36 S.E.2d 860, 862 (S.C. 1945),
where an insurer was allowed to recover death benefits paid for a sailor missing at sea
after the government issued a certificate stating the insured "is presumed to have
died." A policy favoring quick payment of insurance claims is said to support such
decisions. An important factor was the war-time setting, which made it impractical
for the insurer to investigate the claim to resolve the uncertainty. Palmer adds that
the result should be otherwise if the insurer paid less than the full amount for that
would suggest the payment was a compromise of a disputed claim. George E. Palmer,
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Duress would have been difficult to make out because South Feather
did nothing improper in making a demand in good faith and Henrici
had an alternative to paying the price demanded, he could have paid
the old price. One court has drawn a boundary between the rule in
U.C.C. § 1-207(1)," 6 which allows a party to perform or accept
performance in a dispute while reserving his rights, and the commonlaw rule of accord and satisfaction, which does not. The case holds
that section 1-207(1) applies in a continuing dispute on an executory
contract.67 The rule is a bit overbroad. Under the rule, Henrici could
not have tried to force a settlement on his terms by tendering a check
for the old price in satisfaction, which seems like the right result.68
But it also means that a lessee could never rely on payment in
satisfaction to resolve a dispute over past rent on a continuing lease,
which is difficult to justify. At the heart of the doctrine of duress is a
concern with threats that would inflict disproportionate harm if
carried out.69 The concern with disproportionality gets at a crucial
factor in these cases. But the law of duress is quite fuzzy once one
gets beyond a few core cases of classically wrongful threats, and there
are cases stating categorically that "it is not duress
for a party to insist
7°
upon what he believes to be his legal rights.
These are threads in a larger tapestry. The law of waiver and
estoppel has a great deal to say about when a person may lose rights
by not insisting upon them. The doctrine of material breach has a
great deal to say about when a person may withhold performance to
protect his rights. In another article, I show that three interests
explain much of the tapestry. These are: (1) the interest in vindicating
rights (familiarly expressed by the expectation principle); (2) the
interest in efficient performance (familiarly expressed by the
mitigation principle); and (3) the interest in minimizing the cost of
contract administration, including uncertainty (less familiarly
expressed by the interest in remedial certainty).
More simply, the
Law of Restitution § 14.7 (1978).
66. This is the rule that permits a party to perform or assent to performance in a
manner demanded or offered by the other party while reserving his rights by stating
that he acts "under protest" or like words.
67. Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983).
68. The concern is that after rightfully rejecting the check, South Feather would
have halted delivery of water for total non-payment.
69. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(a) defines a threat as
improper "if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms" and "the threatened act
would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party making the
threat." Comment f misfires by suggesting that the concern is with malice or
vindictiveness rather than with coercion. Illustration 12 gives as an example an
employer's threat to prevent an employee from working elsewhere if he does not
release a claim. The employer makes the threat for his own gain and not out of
malice. If he carries out the threat he probably does it to retain his credibility.
70. Jacobs v. Atlantco Ltd. P'ship No. 1, 373 A.2d 1255, 1261 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1977).
71. Mark P. Gergen, Exit and Loyalty in Contract (forthcoming in a collection of
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goal is to execute a bargain at the least cost and with the least fuss.
The different responses to payment of a disputed claim in a run-ofthe-mill case of a disputed debt and Henrici are easily explained in
terms of these interests. In the run-of-the-mill case, there is no
immediate allocative gain from performance because payment only
alters who holds the money. Should the creditor refuse to accept part
payment, then the resulting delay in payment tends not to complicate
the litigation or to make it more difficult to vindicate the rights of
whoever is in the right. If the creditor is in the right, then he can be
compensated for the delay in payment by adding interest. In Henrici,
non-performance had terrible consequences -the destruction of a
farm. And given the small amount of money in dispute it would have
been very easy for a court to put Henrici in his rightful position if he
had paid what was demanded.
It is easy to justify restitution in Boomer v. Muir in these terms.
Boomer's decision to stay on the job saved time and money, unless
another contractor could have done the work significantly more
quickly and cheaply, and there is no suggestion of that in the case.
Vindicating rights after performance is not as easy as it is in the
situation of Henrici, where it is just a matter of determining who was
entitled to the money in dispute and then adding interest to
compensate for under or overpayment. But Boomer's decision to
continue work did not make the litigation any more difficult. Exact
justice is difficult whether Boomer stays or goes. If Boomer goes and
is in the right in the underlying dispute, then putting him in his rightful
position requires predicting the profit (or loss) he would have earned
had Storrie not breached. If Boomer stays, then putting him in his
rightful position requires much the same determination. The simple
solution of awarding Boomer his costs may over or undercompensate
either way. If Boomer is in the wrong, then his staying simplifies
litigation by minimizing the potential consequential damages from
delay.
2. A Contingent Right to Reimbursement Is Likely To Be in the Joint
Interest of the Parties to a Contract when There Is a Significant Gain
from Performance
This does not directly answer the best argument for denying a
person who performs a disputed obligation a contingent right to
reimbursement. The best argument is that granting this right imposes
on the other party to the contract an obligation that he did not
voluntarily undertake. More precisely, it puts the other party in a
dilemma in which he must either withdraw his claim of a right to the
performance or submit to the risk of being subjected to a new
essays from the International Conference on Comparative Remedies for Breach of
Contract, Tel Aviv, June 2002).
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obligation beyond his original contract. In the context of liability
insurance, it is easy to imagine that the other party is made worse off
by the forced exchange because the insurer may be willing to pay
more to defend or settle the claim than would the insured.
This dilemma is not in itself a reason to reject a contingent right to
reimbursement. Denying a person who may be under an obligation to
perform a contingent right to reimbursement if he is in the right puts
him in a predicament that is the mirror image of the other party's
dilemma. He can assert his right not to perform on the contract only
by withholding performance, which subjects him to a contingent
obligation to compensate the other party for loss from nonperformance should he be in the wrong in the underlying dispute.
Either rule is going to be unfair to someone in that one of the parties
will be disadvantaged in asserting a claim of right.
One way to get beyond the standoff between these arguments is to
ask what arrangement is likely to be in the parties' joint interest. In a
contractual setting, the answer to this question usually will be a
contingent right to reimbursement.
The analysis that follows
considers only the effect of the rule on performance. This effect is so
strong that it likely overwhelms any second-order effects even should
they cut in the other direction, although there is no reason to expect
that they do.72
To simplify, I begin with the more general case where A must
decide whether to perform an act that may benefit himself or B
depending on how a contingency is resolved. Assume A and B
dispute ownership of an asset. A has possession. A is presented with
a one-time opportunity to spend c to improve the value of the asset by
v. This benefit will inure entirely to the asset's true owner. The
contract case is importantly different from this case because the value
to A of performance is avoiding liability to B should A be obligated to
perform.
If v is the same for A and B, then it is in the joint interest of the
parties for A to expend c if v > c. Without a contingent right to
reimbursement, A has too little incentive to spend c. Defining the
probability that A is owner as PR, it is in A's interest to spend c only
if v PR > c. If A is not the owner, imposing a contingent right to
reimbursement brings A's incentives closer into line with what is in
A's and B's joint interest. It gives A an incentive to spend c if v PR, +
c (1- PRo) > c.13
72. The most important second-order effect is on the level of care taken in writing
contracts to eliminate doubts about obligation. A rule that distorts incentives on
performance might be justified on the ground that it produces better incentives in
drafting contracts.
73. In the special case of a disputed contractual obligation, it is possible that B
might collect v from A if A does not expend c and he is found obligated to do so.
Imposing a contingent right to reimbursement may well be in B's interest as well as
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Subjective devaluation74 can be denoted by positing that
expenditure c has a payoff of VA to A if he is the true owner of the
asset and a payoff of vB to B if he is the true owner. Performance is in
the parties' joint interest if VA PR, + v, (1- PRO) > c. Without a
contingent right to reimbursement, A has too little incentive to
expend c. A has an incentive to expend c if vA PR o > c. With a
contingent right to reimbursement, A has too much incentive to
expend c if c > v. Expending c has a positive payoff to A if VA PRO + c
(1- PRo) > c. Which rule creates worse incentives depends on the
values of VA' V, C,and PR o.
A simple example with numbers may help to make this more
concrete. An insurer estimates a 50% probability that a third party
claim against its insured is covered by the policy. Should the third
party claim go to trial, the expected cost is $100,000.15 Before trial, the
insurer receives a settlement offer of $80,000. Without a contingent
right to reimbursement by the insured, the insurer will reject this offer
even though this exposes him to a 50% risk of paying $100,000.76 This
is in the interest of neither the insurer nor the insured if they put the
same price on going to trial. Imposing a contingent right to
reimbursement gives the insurer a net expected gain of $10,000 if it
settles the claim.77 The insured also realizes a net expected gain of
$10,000 from this arrangement if it induces the insurer to settle the
claim where it otherwise would not.78 On the other hand, if the
insured places only a $30,000 price on going to trial,7 9 then imposing a
contingent right to reimbursement may induce the insurer to settle
when that is not in the parties' joint interest. If the insurer can be
certain of collecting the full $80,000 from the insured at no cost (a
being in A's interest with this wrinkle. Defining the probability that A is obligated to
spend c as PR , then imposing a contingent right to reimbursement yields a return of
( v - c (1 - PR,,)). Imposing no such right yields a return of (v PR,,) if we assume
imposing the right induces A to expend c.
74. I take the term from Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution
109 (1985). He uses the term to refer to the argument that we cannot know how
much the defendant was enriched when he receives a benefit in kind because his
enrichment depends upon individual preferences. The argument tends to support the
conclusion that a person ought not be forced to pay for a benefit he did not freely
accept when the value to him is doubtful, which is the traditional position of the law
of restitution.
75. This is composed of the expected judgment discounted by probability plus
legal fees.
76. This settlement eliminates a 50% chance of paying $100,000 at trial at the cost
of $80,000.
77. It eliminates a 50% chance of paying $100,000 at trial at the cost of $80,000,
less a 50% chance of recovering $80,000 from the insured.
78. The settlement eliminates a 50% chance of paying $100,000 at trial at the cost
of a 50% chance of paying $80,000 to the insurer.
79. Although the insurer places a higher price on going to trial, the insured might
put a price of only $30,000 on going to trial because the insured has fewer assets,
thereby placing a ceiling on the amount that the insured can expect to pay in the
event of a loss.
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wildly unrealistic assumption), then it will accept the settlement offer
because it has a positive expected return to it of $10,000,8" although
this has a larger negative expected return of $25,000 to the insured.8"
On the other hand, if the settlement offer is $60,000 and the other
facts are the same, then giving the insurer a contingent right to
reimbursement makes it profitable for the insurer to settle, 2 yielding
an expected gain to it of $20,00083 that exceeds the expected loss to the
insured (-$15,000). 4
If the dispute is over the ownership of a strip of land and the
expenditure is on an improvement that is uniquely of value to A's
adjacent land, then a contingent right to reimbursement gives A too
much incentive to make the expenditure. This possibility may justify a
rule in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
that would allow recovery of an expense in such a case only if it is for
a necessity."
Moving the problem to a contractual setting significantly lessens the

risk of subjective devaluation (or, more precisely, that

VA

> C > V1,

which is the problematic alignment).86 That the defendant contracted
for the performance or demanded it as his due increases the likelihood
that it is of significant value to him. Further, in the contractual setting
the value to a person of performing a disputed obligation often is
avoiding the risk of liability for the other's losses on default. The
value to the obligor of performing the disputed obligation will tend
towards the value to the obligee.87
Showing that an exchange is likely to be efficient does not by itself
justify making the exchange compulsory on the beneficiary through
the law of restitution. Generally, the law of restitution compels an
exchange on policy grounds only if there are significant impediments
to bargaining. Human psychology is the principal impediment to
rational bargaining in a contract dispute. Parties to a dispute could
negotiate a contingent right to reimbursement-it is similar to a
standstill agreement-but this requires a fair degree of trust in the
80. See supra note 77.
81. The settlement eliminates a 50% chance of paying $30,000 at the cost of a 50%
chance of paying $80,000.
82. Without such a right, settlement eliminates a 50% chance of the insurer paying
$100,000 at a cost of $60,000.
83. The settlement eliminates a 50% chance of paying $100,000 at the cost of a

50% chance of paying $60,000.
84. The settlement eliminates a 50% chance of paying $30,000 at the cost of a 50%
chance of paying $60,000.
85. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
86. The contractual setting may also exacerbate the psychological barriers if A's
threat not to perform is seen by B as a breach of faith.
87. This principle is not categorically true in the contract setting, as the example
of liability insurance shows. A person may demand performance under a contract
believing that he is entitled to it at no additional cost to himself though he would be
unwilling to pay the cost.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

other party and sympathy for the other party's legal position. Trust
and sympathy are likely to be in short supply when people disagree
about their rights and obligations under a contract. Indeed, a
background rule of no right to reimbursement encourages behavior
that tends to raise hackles. The rule encourages a person to threaten
to withhold performance even though it is common knowledge that
carrying out the threat would inflict a grievous loss on the other party.
This sort of analysis cannot establish the appropriate level of
generality for whatever rules we may choose to regulate performance
in a dispute. In theory we might lump performance of a disputed
contractual obligation together with an improvement to property of
disputed ownership under a single rule, or we might have one rule for
liability insurance and another for construction contracts. This
analysis only tells us that the likelihood of subjective devaluation is a
key consideration in designing these rules.
There are other
considerations in choosing the appropriate level of generality. The
rule must be general enough so that lawyers can be expected to know
it but narrow enough so that it can be applied without too much
uncertainty at the point of application. The rule I propose fits
comfortably within existing law, which suggests to me it strikes a
tolerable balance on these counts.

C. A Rule
The doctrinal and policy arguments support the following narrow
rule:
A person who renders a performance not due under a contract has a
claim in restitution against the other party to the contract if
(a) the person reasonably believes the performance may be due
under the contract or the other demands the performance as due
under the contract;
(b) the other had reason to know the person performs under protest
or reserves the right to seek restitution;
(c) the performance avoids a loss; and
(d) the performance does not unduly complicate litigation.
The voluntary payment doctrine, which cuts off the right to
reimbursement of money paid on a doubtful claim, states the opposite
rule. Requirement (c) distinguishes cases covered by the voluntary
payment doctrine.
A performance that consists of the payment of a disputed debt may
fall within the rule, although a delay in payment would cause no
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aggregate loss, if refusal of the performance due in return for the
payment would cause a loss. Henrici88 and Nurdin89 illustrate and
provide authority for this proposition. The logic is that the other may
overreact to nonpayment. The doctrine of material breach deters
overreaction to nonperformance by treating overreaction as a breach
of contract. This rule gets at the same phenomenon by eliminating the
provocation to overreact.
The case of the mechanic who knowingly exceeds the owner's
instructions in working on an automobile is outside the rule because
requirement (a) is not met.9 The mechanic will recover only if an
emergency justifies his acting without first securing a contract from
the owner.91 The situation in Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd.,92
also falls outside the rule because of the same requirement, but the
plaintiff would look elsewhere in the law of restitution for a claim. In
Gidatex, the restitution claim arose from a dispute between the
plaintiff and defendant over the plaintiff's right to sell products
licensed by the defendant in the United States. 93 After the defendant
lost the license dispute, it brought a restitution claim to recover its
investments, claiming that these investments enhanced the value of
the license.94 The court denied the restitution claim.95 The decision is
consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, which provides for restitution in this situation only if the
'
plaintiff spares the defendant a "necessary expense."96
The
requirement that the expense be necessary limits restitution to the
class of claims where subjective devaluation is least likely. Leebov v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,9" and McNeilab, Inc. v. North
River Insurance Co.,98 test the limits of the concept of a necessary
expense. Both cases involve restitution claims brought by an insured
against its liability insurer for expenditures made to reduce the loss on
an accident, but they reach opposite results. 99 Whatever the correct
88. 170 P. 1135 (Cal. 1918). The decision in Henrici assumes that the farmer could
pay what he irrigation district demanded and later sue to recover the payment if it
was not due. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
89. 1 W.L.R. 1249 (Ch. 1999). See supra notes 29, 37-39 and accompanying text.
90. J.L. Carpenter Co. v, Richardson, 172 A. 226, 227 (Conn. 1934) (denying
recovery for labor and materials to repairman who knowingly exceeded his orders).
91. Berry v. Barbour, 279 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1954) (awarding restitution to
contractor hired to remodel theater who repaired roof after fire to prevent water
damage while the owner of the theater was absent).
92. 49 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
93. Id. at 298-99.
94. Id. at 299.
95. Id.

96. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 24 & cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
97. 165 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1960).
98. 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1986).
99. In Leebov, a contractor sacrificed heavy machinery to stop a cave-in that
would have damaged adjoining property. 165 A.2d at 84. The court held the insurer
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result may be in these cases, they are not within the rule because
requirement (a) is not met.""'
II. ABOLISH THE GENERAL RIGHT TO RESTITUTION ON TOTAL
BREACH OF CONTRACT

The optional right to restitution on total breach of contract has
been criticized on policy grounds because the rule distorts incentives
in contract performance.1 "° Boomer v. Muir turns out to be a bad
example-the availability of restitution had desirable incentive effects
in that case-but the general point still holds true. That a narrow rule
could cover Boomer leads to the question what, if anything, is to be
liable. In McNeilab the manufacturer of Tylenol undertook a massive product recall
after incidents of product tampering. 645 F. Supp. at 527. The court rejected the
restitution claim.
100. Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414 (R.I. 1969), is a good case for exploring the
boundaries of some of the relevant rules. B refused to accept delivery of a horse from
S, claiming the horse was lame. Id. at 415. The deliveryman took the horse to P who
cared for it for several months. At some point during these months, P learned that B
and S disagreed about who was responsible for the horse and that B had said he
would have nothing to do with the horse. Id. S sued B, and the court determined that
title in the horse had passed to B and that he had to pay S the contract price. Id. at
415-16. At this point P sued B for the cost of several months care. Id. at 415. The
court denied P's restitution claim on the ground that P was a volunteer. Id. at 418. It
did not rely upon a crucial fact, that P eventually sold the horse and kept the price,
which presumably was less than the cost of care. This would preclude a claim by P as
a protector of another's property. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 21 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (limiting restitution to the loss avoided
by the owner and stating that beneficiary may avoid obligation by disclaiming
benefit). P might well have a claim as a protector of another's property had B taken
the horse once he was determined to be the owner. The dispute between B and S
over who was responsible for the horse should excuse P's failure to get a
reimbursement agreement.
Had the deliveryman returned the horse to S, who cared for the horse until
ownership was resolved, then S would be entitled to recover the cost of care for the
horse as contract damages because the cost qualifies as incidental damages. The
structure of the situation is different from Boomer v. Muir. In the variation on Bailey
v. West, S's care for the horse minimizes his own loss on the contract should he be in
the wrong; and it minimizes B's damages should S be in the right on the underlying
dispute. In Boomer, the subcontractor's continued work minimizes the damages he
owes the general contractor should he be in the wrong in the underlying dispute, but
it provides no benefit to the subcontractor should he be in the right.
101. Kull explains: "both parties acquire an incentive to expend resources, not in
performance or the negotiation of appropriate contract modifications, but in strategic
behavior intended to enhance their position in potential litigation. While the
performing party's objective is to provoke a default, the recipient's goal is to
safeguard a favorable bargain-avoiding the risk of default by excessive precautions
and 'overperformance."' Kull, supra note 10, at 1472.
Henry Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the
Partially Performing Seller, 92 Yale L.J. 14 (1982), offers an extended attack of the
traditional rule on economic and liberal grounds that models a discrete decision to
perform or breach by an actor who is certain of the legal consequences of his decision.
For standard defenses of the option, see Palmer, supra note 65, § 4.4; George E.
Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 Ohio
St. L.J. 264 (1959).
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said for the general rule beyond this situation. I join others in arguing
that the general rule should be abolished.
A. The TraditionalRule Is a Terrible Solution to the Boomer Problem
The traditional rule is both underbroad and grossly overbroad if the
goal is to award performance in a dispute when performance avoids a
loss without complicating litigation.112 The rule is underbroad in two
respects. First, the rule applies only in the event of breach and so it
does not reach cases like ABC Electric, in which a person performs an
obligation he disputes at the demand of the other." 3 Second, the rule
does not apply if the plaintiff has completed performance. 0 4 The
latter limitation on the rule may explain why Boomer pulled off the
job shortly before the work was done.
The gross overbreadth of the traditional rule is obvious. The rule
has produced some perverse decisions. Ironically, one of the more
perverse, United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc.,105 appears in many
contracts casebooks as the primary case to illustrate the right to
restitution on breach. 10 6 It is the worst possible teaching case unless
the goal is to make the law seem idiotic. The decision rewards a
subcontractor for escalating a contract dispute and abandoning work
without justification. A subcontractor hired to do steel work on a
large construction project disagreed with the general contractor about

who was to the pay the rent on a large crane.0 7 The general
contractor did not pay the disputed charge and the subcontractor
pulled off the job.0 8 The trial court reduced the subcontractor's

102. In some states the restitution doctrine is more tailored. In the state of
Washington, for example, a contractor may recover costs over contract price in
restitution only if his employer's interference caused delays that "were so substantial
as to remove the written contract of the parties as a practical basis for computing
damages." V.C. Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 514 P.2d 1381, 1385
(Wash. 1973). Port Chester Electrical Construction Corp. v. HBE Corp., 782 F. Supp.
837 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd 978 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1992), also predicates recovery of
costs on connecting the cost increase to a delay for which the defendant was
responsible. The decision was reversed and remanded to consider the import of a no
damage for delay clause. Id. at 823. Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), rejects a total cost claim because of a
failure to tie the breach to costs and a restitution claim on the basis of a Utah rule that
"damages are controlled by the contractual remedies fashioned by the parties unless it
can be shown that the work performed was so different from the work contemplated
by the contract that additional recovery in quantum meruit is warranted."
103. See supra notes 23-28, 34 and accompanying text.
104. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373(2) (1981). The Restatement justifies
this on grounds of remedial simplicity. See id. at cmt. b.
105. 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973).
106. Steven J. Burton, Principles of Contract Law 369 (2d ed. 2001); John P.
Dawson et al., Contracts Cases and Comments 99 (7th ed. 1998); Lon L. Fuller &
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law 349 (7th ed. 2001); Charles L. Knapp et
al., Problems in Contract Law 1116 (4th ed. 1999).
107. 479 F.2d at 640.
108. Id.
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damages because it would have lost money on the contract." 9 The
court of appeals held that the subcontractor could recover its entire
cost in restitution. 10
The traditional rule has particularly perverse effects if it is coupled
with a rule denying restitution to a person who performs a disputed
obligation at the demand of the other-i.e., a rule denying restitution
in cases like ABC Electric."' This combination creates a sharp
dilemma for a person who disputes his performance obligation under
a winning bargain. If he stands on his claim of right refusing to
perform the disputed obligation and turns out to be wrong, then he
forfeits his profits on the bargain under the traditional rule. If he
performs as the other demands, he cannot get back the cost of his
excess performance even if he is in the right.
An illustration makes this more vivid. Coal company S has a multiyear contract with utility B to supply the output of S's coal mine to B's
adjacent coal-powered plant. The contract has an ambiguous price
adjustment clause. B honestly believes the correct price (say $20 per
ton) is far below the current price at the nearest market (say $40 per
ton). S honestly believes the correct price is significantly higher than
B's estimate (say $30 per ton) but still below the current market price.
The cost of shipping coal to or from the area of the mine and plant to
the nearest market is $5 per ton. B is in a tough spot. If B tenders $20
per ton as payment but owes $30, then S may have the option to
rescind the contract and get out of what is a losing bargain to it at
either price. B can pay what he thinks he owes only at the risk of
forfeiting his gains on the contract should he be wrong. On the other
hand, if B pays $30 per ton under protest and it turns out that $20 is
the correct price, he will be unable to recover the overpayment in
restitution.
B. When Is Restitution an Appropriate Remedy on Breach?
The traditional rule would not have survived if it did not work
tolerably well in most cases where it is applied. Boomer v. Muir is not
the only situation where the traditional rule gets it right. It is
uncontroversial that restitution is appropriate when it best
compensates the plaintiff's loss from breach. Depending on the case,
109. Id.
110. Id. Perverse outcomes usually can be avoided under the common law, and
Algernon Blair is no exception. The trial court might well have held that the general
contractor's act of withholding payment was not a total breach justifying rescission.
This is a strong argument, for the general withheld payment on the honest belief that
it was not due and the delay in payment would not have irreparably harmed the
subcontractor. The appellate court is more to blame-though it was not helped by
the defendant's counsel, who failed to preserve the issue of material breach -because
it reversed the trial court by applying the traditional rule without thinking through the
situation.
111. See supra notes 23-28, 34, 103 and accompanying text.
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restitution can be either restoration of the plaintiff's costs or
disgorgement of the defendant's gains from the breach or from the
contract.1 12 Boomer v. Muir could be decided on this basis as well as
the rule I propose because the cost overruns were attributable to the
defendant's breach. Something like the rule I propose is still
necessary to explain why the voluntary payment doctrine does not cut
off the claim and to cover cases like ABC Electric. Restitution may
also have a role to play in requiring disgorgement of gain from certain
opportunistic breaches.
Others have written piercingly on this
question so I will not explore it.1" 3
The following hypothetical presents an appealing case for
restitution on breach, although it puts the plaintiff in a much better
position than would performance because he made a bad bargain.
A employs B to drill an exploratory oil well and pays B in advance.

Before B does any work, they unexpectedly learn that there is no oil.
112. An example is the election of restitution to recover the contract price upon
total or close to total failure of performance. See, e.g., Economy Swimming Pool Co.
v. Freeling, 370 S.W.2d 438 (Ark. 1963) (allowing a plaintiff to elect restitution as a
remedy where contractor was hired to build a watertight fallout shelter and the
shelter was useless because of incurable seepage).
Sometimes the defendant's profit from breach is the best measure of the plaintiff's
loss from breach. An example is where the defendant violates a covenant not to
compete. What may seem to be a disgorgement remedy, argued for in Winstar Corp.
v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 839 (1996), and its
progeny, may be justified along similar lines. The cases are important because of the
huge amounts of money at stake. These cases arose after the United States
government reneged on a promise of favorable accounting treatment made to
acquirers of failing savings and loans. The plaintiffs sought damages equal to the net
liabilities of the S & L's they acquired. See id. at 858. A hypothetical shows the logic
behind this remedy. A acquires a business from B with assets of $20 and liabilities of
$30. To induce A to take over the business B guarantees A's credit on the acquired
business, and A's other business. B reneges on the guarantee and A fails. The net
negative value of the business A acquired-$10-represents its cost in the transaction
and is a presumptive measure of the floor of the expected value of B's guarantee to A.
The real issue in the case is whether the book value gets at the real net negative value.
113. Peter Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution 334-36 (1985) (advocating
gains-based damages for "deliberate exploitation" or where purpose of contract was
to preclude defendant from engaging in the act from which the gain accrued); Hanoch
Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law
Theory, 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 115 (2000); Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of
Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a
Wrong, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 504 (1980); Andrew Kull, Disgorgementfor Breach, the
"Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of Contracts,79 Tex. L. Rev. 2021, 2049-50
(2001) (advocating disgorgement of profits "to deter a form of conscious wrongdoing
that encounters no adequate disincentive if the defendant's liability is restricted to the
plaintiff's loss").
Kull cites the intentional violation of a restrictive covenant as an example of a case
where restitution is justified on this ground. Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d
720 (2d Cir. 1992), is an illustration of this example. Bausch & Lomb recovered a
prepaid royalty on a Restitution theory as a remedy for Bressler's violation of an
exclusivity provision and other uncured breaches. Id. at 730. An interesting feature of
the case is that the contract stated the royalty was refundable under "no
circumstances." Id. Friedmann, supra, supplies many other illustrations.
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B does not drill the well because B is certain that drilling is
worthless.
The instinctive response is that B ought to return the payment.
What may drive this instinct is that while restitution puts A in a better
position than he bargained for, it does this by taking what would be a
windfall from B.114 The English have called this the case of "skimped
performance."' 15 This is not a trivial matter. It may lay a basis for a
restitution claim in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,16 a
case familiar to most American law students, if the plaintiffs can
establish what they gave up in negotiating the mineral lease in return
for the coal company's unkept promise to restore the land.
Restitution of the foregone payment (or the expected cost of drilling)
could as well rest on the first ground-that it is the best measure of
the Peevyhouse's loss from the damage to their land.
Finally, a right to restitution on breach may be justified as
concomitant to the power to claim discharge on breach. Discharge
often leaves the non-defaulting party in a better position than he
bargained for at the expense of the defaulting party in a way that
undoes the parties' bargain." 7 A familiar example is the discharge of
an insurer from its obligation under a policy because of a minor
default by the insured, such as failing to file a claim in a timely
fashion. The law strives to avoid forfeiture -particularly in cases like
the example-through an interpretive presumption, rules on waiver
and impossibility, and, in a handful of states, a doctrine that allows a
court to override a condition to avoid disproportionate forfeiture. But
the rules that temper the power of discharge apply only in extreme

114. Restitution in the hypothetical (but not in Peevyhouse) may be justified for a
different reason. Steve Hedley writes that it is "not ...particularly controversial"
that "[fJor a sufficiently serious breach, the claimant may seek return of what they
supplied under the contract, and may succeed in this, so long as it is possible to return
it precisely, and that they can return anything the defendant supplied to them." Steve
Hedley, Restitution: Its Division and Ordering 48 (2001). Andrew Kull has similar
views:
These were cases, briefly, in which the nature of the default suggested a
relative indifference to the contractual exchange on the part of the
defendant; where the partly performed transaction was easily reversed; and
where rescission of the contract was cheaper than enforcement. A simple
case, meeting all three criteria, is one in which a buyer pays in advance for
goods that a seller does not bother to deliver.
Kull, supra note 10, at 1476. The interest in remedial simplicity drives both
arguments. Later in the same article, Kull comments that "each of the cases at this
level involves circumstances in which the undoing of the bargain is at least as easy as
the calculation of contract damages." Id. at 1492-93.
115. Attorney-General v. Blake, Ch. 439, 458 (Eng. C.A. 1997), appeal dismissed, 1
A.C. 268 (H.L. 2001).
116. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). Kull makes this point, supra note 113, at 2046-47.
117. Corbin explains that discharge "operates as a penalty, however, since it
deprives the one guilty of the 'breach' of the benefit of his bargain, the possible
profits of performance." 6 Corbin, supra note 62, § 1253, at 10 n.7.
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cases. Discharge often distorts contractual payoffs in subtle ways that
go unnoticed.118
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts equates the right to
discharge and the right to restitution on breach by making a finding of
"total breach" a trigger to both." 9 This is difficult to justify as a
general matter.1 2 The interests in remedial simplicity and finality
easily explain why it ought to be easier to withhold performance than
to get back the value of performance already rendered. But there are
good arguments to equate the two responses when the claim is to get
back the value of performance that is rendered after default.1 21 It is
118. Consider the case of a wrongfully terminated employee who recovers wages
for the remainder of the contract term and is discharged from a covenant not to
compete. See Ward v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 443 N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (Mass.
1983). In theory, the employer ought to be able to subtract from the wages the
expected value of the gain to the employee from being freed of the covenant. This
adjustment is similar to subtracting the plaintiff's avoided cost of completing a
contract from the contract price. The adjustment is not made because the expected
value of the gain to the employee from being freed of the covenant is too speculative.
This is the same reason why the value of leisure is not subtracted from the wages
recovered by a wrongfully terminated employee who cannot find suitable alternative
work.
119. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a total breach as an uncurable
material breach or a default coupled with a repudiation. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 243. Sections 243(1) and (2) make total breach a trigger for discharge.
Section 373 makes it a trigger for restitution.
There is much case law to the contrary, holding that the remedy of restitution is
discretionary and requires a special showing. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Nemeyer, 570
A.2d 164, 169 (Conn. 1990) ("[A] material breach of the partnership agreement, does
not automatically and unconditionally entitle the plaintiffs to recover their investment
in the partnership. The award of a restitutionary remedy for breach of contract
depends upon a showing of what justice requires in the particular circumstances.");
Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 718 P.2d 551, 558-59 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985) (directing that trial court should not calculate restitution damages to put the
plaintiff in position better than that promised absent a special showing of factors to
justify such a remedy); Patch v. Arsenault, 653 A.2d 1079, 1082-83 (N.H. 1995)
(rescission and restitution should be granted only "'when in all the circumstances it
appears right and just to the parties to do so"' (quoting Barber v. Somers, 150 A.2d
408, 411 (N.H. 1959))) . This is usually explained by rescission's origin in equity.
Barber, 150 A.2d 408. The factors that are said to guide this discretion-whether the
remedy is necessary to put the plaintiff in the promised position, the hardship of the
remedy on the defendant, and the difficulty of returning the parties to the status
quo-are essentially the same factors that guide the analysis of material breach, which
is discretionary in practice though not from equity in origin.
120. Corbin is eloquent on this point. 6 Corbin, supra note 62, § 1253, at 13-17 &
nn.9-12; see also Kull, supra note 10, at 1476.
121. This justifies the result in EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Resource
Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1995). Hydrosphere licensed its Hydrodata
product line to EarthInfo. Id. at 116. A dispute arose when Hydrosphere demanded
royalties on a derivative product marketed by EarthInfo. Id. EarthInfo responded to
the demand by withholding all royalty payments. Id. The court in a two-to-one
decision allowed Hydrosphere to recover EarthInfo's profits from the Hydrodata line
from the date that EarthInfo withheld royalties. Id. at 117.
The opinion is a hopeless muddle. The opinion says several times that the
wrongfulness of the defendant's behavior matters. Id. at 119. But other factors
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well established that a landlord may recover market rent, though it
may exceed the rent due under the lease after he declares the tenant
in default. 2 A formal argument for this result is that after the
landlord declares the tenant in default, the landlord has the right to
the possession of the premises. His damages from the infringement of
that right are fair market rent. A practical argument for the result is
that it encourages the landlord to allow the tenant to remain in
possession. It is a carrot to encourage the landlord not to use self-help
to evict the tenant or otherwise to interfere with the tenant's
possession.'23 The practical argument is similar to the argument for
restitution in Boomer v. Muir, because sudden removal of a tenant is
likely to impose a significant loss.
C. A General Right to Restitution on Breach Does Not Inhere in the
Concept of Unjust Enrichment
We can go this far, but no further, in justifying a right to restitution
on breach of contract on the basis of contract law policies or
principles. The relevant policies are those that favor vindicating rights
(embodied in the expectation principle) at the least cost (the
mitigation principle) and the least fuss (the interest in remedial
simplicity). Some argue that this approach to the issue is deeply
misguided because a right to restitution on breach is justified by an
''autonomous" principle of unjust enrichment that is independent
of
contract law. 2 4 The argument goes something like this: Unjust
enrichment occurs when one person makes a nonconsensual transfer
to another. A transferee's breach of contract, if sufficiently severe,
vitiates the transferor's consent to a transfer made under a contract.
Therefore, a person who breaches a contract is unjustly enriched if he
retains benefits received under the contract. 5
The argument
mentioned in the same context go to the subsidiary question of whether a defendant
should be given credit for his contribution in measuring gains-based damages. On the
question of whether gains-based damages were appropriate at all, the opinion merely
says that they were imposed "since [EarthInfo's] breach was conscious and
substantial." Id. at 120. This treats any significant, intentional breach as grounds for
disgorgement of profits from breach.
122. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 405 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App.
1981). See generally C.S. Patrinelis, Annotation, Measure of Damages for Tenant's
Failureto Surrender Possession of Rented Premises, 32 A.L.R.2d 582 (1953).
123. The trend is to restrict the use of self-help by a landlord. Berg v. Wiley, 264
N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978), is representative of the general trend but goes further by
stating an absolute prohibition. Most states permit self-help in principle but not in
practice by holding a landlord to a high standard on the use of force with severe
sanctions for violating the standard.
124. Skelton, supra note 10, at 7; Stephen A. Smith, Concurrent Liability in
Contract and Unjust Enrichment: The Fundamental Breach Requirement, 115 L.Q.
Rev. 245, 249 (1999).
125. Smith is terser: "P gives D money (or benefits in kind) on the condition that D
does something. D does not fulfill the condition. P asks, rightly, for the money back.
End of story." Smith, supra note 124, at 249.
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analogizes a broken contract to a conditional gift with an unfulfilled
condition.
This is a conceptual argument. The claim is that a right to
restitution on breach inheres in the concept of unjust enrichment. A
general answer to this sort of argument is that abstract legal concepts,
like the concept of unjust enrichment, are not a basis for solving
concrete problems. 126 They are like headings in a table of contents or
in an index to the law that we use to organize the rules that do the
work on the ground level. The criteria for the validity of a rule can be
endlessly debated, but the claim that a rule is justified by the general
heading under which it is found is fairly weak on its face. Unless the
heading expresses or corresponds to some fundamental value (the
concept of unjust enrichment does not on its face), the force of the
claim derives from the value we place on having rules correspond with
on having rules fit
the organizing concepts and the value we place
127
pattern.
consistent
and
coherent
a
in
together
I answer the conceptual argument in this spirit by showing that
there is a better abstract account of the law of restitution and the
principle of unjust enrichment that excludes a general right to
restitution on breach of contract. The account that follows is not
idiosyncratic (which would be a major strike against it) because it is
consistent with the general structure of the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. 28 I use broad strokes because
they suffice to make what is finally a modest point. The exercise has
some slight secondary value in situating the rule I propose in Part I
within the law of restitution.
It is hotly debated whether unjust enrichment is a useful concept at
all. 29 Those who think the concept has its uses tend to agree that it
covers only part of the law of restitution. The other parts cover
restitution as a remedy for wrongs and what Peter Birks calls policybased restitution. In the latter category, restitution is used as an
incentive or a reward to encourage a person to do an act that benefits
126. 1 expect that few American legal academics will be persuaded by this type of
argument because a mixture of ignorance and realism makes us fairly insensitive to
conceptual arguments in private law. Constitutional law is a different matter.
127. Insisting that rules correspond with organizing concepts is one way to preserve
coherency and consistency among rules within the same concept, though at the price
of creating anomalies at the borders of the organizing concepts.
128. The argument from the concept of unjust enrichment perverts the usual
meaning of the concept in a contractual setting. In this setting, the baseline for
measuring whether there are unjust gains and losses is the parties' bargain and not
their pre-contractual position. For example, forfeiture is* equated with unjust
enrichment. See, e.g., Quigley v. Acker, 955 P.2d 1377, 1385 (Mont. 1998). Forfeiture
occurs when denying a person the agreed return on a contract gives the other a
windfall under the contract.
129. The champion on the side of the principle is Peter Birks. His opus is
Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985). Steve Hedley, Restitution: Its Division
and Ordering (2001), is an engaging statement of an opposing view.
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another. The Third Restatement puts these rules under the general
13 " A case can be made for either
heading "Intentional Transfers.""
heading. Birks' heading emphasizes the reasons behind the rules
within the heading (they are forward-looking reasons of policy); the
Third Restatement's heading emphasizes that plaintiffs know what
they are doing when they act to benefit another under these rules
(otherwise an incentive keyed to the benefit would be of little value).
While the rescue cases may come first to mind to many American
lawyers in thinking of this heading of obligation (Cotnam v. Wisdom131
is a first-year staple), most of the law under the heading involves what
'
These
the Third Restatement calls "self-interested intervention."132
are cases where a person knowingly benefits another in pursuing his
own interest. The rule I propose to reward performance in a contract
dispute fits here.
There also is a fair amount of consensus on the case that is at the
center of the remaining part of the law of restitution. This is the case
of a mistaken transfer. The argument is over the general heading, if
any, that best covers this case and over the other cases (if any) that
belong under the same general heading. The conceptual argument
sketched above places atop this area of law a principle of unjust
enrichment aimed at reversing nonconsensual transfer. This schema
logically groups breach of contract with mistake. It also assumes,
controversially, that the heading is more than just a heading. It is a
principle with some normative weight.
A difficulty with this formulation of a general principle of unjust
enrichment and this grouping is that most of the law on mistaken
transfers is framed around cases in which the defendant is faultless.
This is why the law goes to great lengths to ensure that a defendant is
made to give up no more than he gained from the plaintiff's mistake.
A general principle that is aimed at reversing nonconsensual transfers
elides this important feature of the law because consent turns on the
plaintiff's state of mind and not on the defendant's degree of fault.
Some grounds for vitiating consent involve blameworthy conduct by
the defendant, including breach of contract. Indeed, restitution on
breach is unlike restitution on mistake because the measure of
restitution on breach is the plaintiff's loss and not the defendant's
gain, assuming the loss is greater.'3 3
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
eschews a live general principle of unjust enrichment.3 4 It places
130. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ch. 3 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2002).
131. 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907).
132. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ch. 3, topic 2
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
133. Professor Perillo makes this point. See generally Perillo, supra note 5.
134. Section one states the general principle that "[a] person who is unjustly
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mistaken transfers in a general category with the purposefully opaque
and inert heading "Transfers Subject to Avoidance" alongside a grab
bag of concepts that state other grounds for vitiating consent.135
Notably, these other grounds do not include breach of contract or

failure of consideration (the latter is a significant concept in English
law).
The Third Restatement accounts for the law's solicitude for the
faultless defendant along with the law's hostility to the officious
intermeddler by postulating a general principle opposing forced

exchange as a counter-principle to the general principle of unjust

enrichment. 3 6 To this end, the Third Restatement establishes the
primacy of contract over restitution by stating that restitution is

concerned with transactions that "take place outside the framework of
an enforceable contract."' 37 A principle of primacy of contract follows
from a principle opposing forced exchange because contract, being
voluntary, is the preferred mechanism for exchange. While this
account of the law has its problems,138 it corresponds with the ground-

enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the other." Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 (Discussion Draft, 2000). Section
two then undercuts the principle with the statement "[t]he fact that a person has
received or obtained a benefit without paying for it does not of itself establish that the
recipient has been unjustly enriched." Id. § 2(3) (Discussion Draft, 2000).
135. The grounds, other than mistake, for vitiating consent are fraud, duress, undue
influence, incapacity, lack of authority, and legal compulsion. Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment ch. 3, topics 2 & 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
A common denominator is that none of these rules require blameworthy conduct by
the defendant. Fraud will be dealt with separately as a wrong. Id. § 13 cmt. a.
136. The principle opposing forced exchange appears in the Third Restatement's
black letter on mistaken improvements: "A remedy for mistaken improvement that
subjects the owner to a forced exchange will be qualified or limited to avoid undue
prejudice to the owner." Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
§ 10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). Many of the Third Restatement's specific
limitations on restitution follow from the principle opposing forced exchange. The
general rule on self-interested intervention follows straight from it. The selfinterested intervenor will recover only if the benefit he confers is monetary, or he
replaces a money obligation of equal or greater amount, or "relief may be allowed to
the claimant, by way of specific restitution or otherwise, in a manner that does not
require the recipient to pay for a nonmoney benefit the recipient had no opportunity
to refuse." Id. § 23(d) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
137. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2(2) (Discussion
Draft, 2000). A second principle applies in the case of an intentional transfer and
states that there is no liability in Restitution "unless the circumstances of the
transaction are such as to excuse the claimant from the necessity of basing a claim to
payment on a contract with the recipient." Id. § 2(4) (Discussion Draft, 2000). This
gives substantive content to the concept of officiousness.
138. One criticism is that it does not adequately distinguish restitution for wrongs
and restitution to reverse mistaken transfers. See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and
Wrongful Enrichment, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1767 (2001). The fighting issue in the
borderland between contract and restitution is the extent to which restitution will
rectify unjust enrichment in informal relationships and pre-contractual dealings where
the parties could have written a contract to define their rights and obligations, but
they understandably did not.
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level rules better than does an account organized around a general
principle of unjust enrichment that is aimed at reversing
nonconsensual transfers. This schema makes the claim that there is an
autonomous principle of unjust enrichment in the law of restitution
that is a basis for subverting bargains appear deeply wrongheaded.
The Restatement goes a bit overboard in trying to wall off contract
from restitution. The statement that restitution is concerned with
transactions that "take place outside the framework of an enforceable
contract" is reminiscent of the old saw that "no quasi-contractual
claim can arise when a contract exists between the parties concerning
the same subject matter on which the quasi-contractual claim rests."'39
These statements are vacuous or wrong. The old saw is from an
opinion in which the court went on to say that the general principle
does not apply "when the express contract does not fully address a
14
subject matter.""
The two statements give nearly opposite answers
to the question of whether claims that sound in restitution can be used
to fill in gaps in contracts. The old saw proscribes gap-filling if the
contract "concerns" the subject matter of the claim. The qualifier
allows gap-filling unless the contract "fully addresses" the subject
matter of the claim.
The truth, not surprisingly, lies somewhere in the middle. The law
of restitution is the home of some implied contract terms. Why they
ended up there is beside the point. They are there and any account of
the law of restitution is going to have to incorporate them. An
uncontroversial example is the right of a defaulter to recover the value
of his part performance to avoid unjust enrichment. The example is
uncontroversial because the concept of unjust enrichment is used to
fulfill goals of contract law. It takes a very clear signal in a contract to
displace an implied term that usually is in a party's interest. The right
of a defaulter to recover the value of his performance to avoid unjust
enrichment is sticky in precisely this way. Indeed, the defaulter's right
to compensation might not give way even to a clear term conditioning
the right on non-default, as there are tools to ignore a condition if
honoring it would result in disproportionate forfeiture, which, of
course, is a species of unjust enrichment.
Another example of the stickiness of some terms implied through
the law of restitution arises in the same factual context as Boomer v.
Muir. The problem arises when a contractor sues in restitution to
recover cost overruns due to delay on a project and the defendant
invokes a "no damage for delay" clause in the construction contract.
The cases exhibit the familiar tension between respect for the parties'
bargain and distrust of contract terms that immunize a party from
139. County Comm'rs of Caroline County v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 747
A.2d 600 (Md. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 609 n.12 (citing Klein v. Arkoma Prod. Co., 73 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir.
1996)).
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liability for losses caused by his own negligence or worse. The
modern trend is to confront this tension head-on with a multi-factor
analysis. 41
CONCLUSION

It is time to do away with the general right to restitution on breach
of contract. The good done by the general rule can be done by rules
that are more closely tailored to the specific situations where
restitution is an appropriate remedy on breach. I can think of only
four: (1) where restitution is the best measure of the plaintiff's loss
from breach; (2) where restitution is appropriate to deter
opportunistic breach; (3) where restitution deprives the defendant of a
windfall; and (4) where restitution provides the value of performance
rendered after discharge. Boomer v. Muir should be addressed by a
rule that allows a person who performs a disputed obligation to
recover the cost if the performance was not due and performance
avoids a loss without unduly complicating litigation. This rule gets at
the real issue in Boomer, which is explaining why the voluntary
payment doctrine and the larger interest in finality does not cut off a
claim of a right when a person performs a disputed obligation.

141. See White Oak Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 585 A.2d 1199, 1203 (Conn. 1991);
Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 493 N.E.2d 905 (N.Y. 1986)
(allowing damages for "(1) delays caused by the contractee's bad faith or its willful,
malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2) uncontemplated delays, (3) delays so
unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by the
contractee, and (4) delays resulting from the contractee's breach of a fundamental
obligation of the contract"). See generally Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity
and Construction of "No-Damage" Clause with Respect to Delay in Building or
Construction Contract,74 A.L.R.3d 187 (1976).
United States for Use of Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606
(2d Cir. 1944), is one of the more interesting cases. The subcontractor's costs
increased because of unforeseen difficult soil conditions. Id. at 607. The general
contractor had negligently tested the soil and represented it to be workable. Id. at 608.
The general contractor's agreement with a subcontractor had a disclaimer and a
promise by the subcontractor to make no claims for difficulties resulting from latent
conditions. Id.
The decision allows the subcontractor to recover costs
notwithstanding this contract term on the reasoning that the term fell when the
subcontractor rescinded the contract and sued in restitution. Id. at 609. The result is
troubling until one adds the facts that the general contractor had charged and
collected for the additional costs under its contract with the government.
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